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outside London, "scarcely stirred" (in John Cannon's words).
It should also be mentioned that Newman can be very dismissive of
other scholars' work (characterized, in one instance, as "mere words and
twaddle," p. 90). While this may make enjoyable reading (or writing) for
some, such rhetoric is punctured by a more judicious assessment of what
has and has not been accomplished. As mentioned above, nationalism has
not been totally ignored by historians. Similarly, when Newman laments
the absence of a "revisionist account of English social history in the eighteenth century, an account giving full emphasis to the social conflict that
increasingly divided the country" (p. 90), one wonders what he thinks
historians (or some of them) have been doing in the nearly twenty-five
years since The Making of the English Working Class first appeared.
Newman is certainly right in drawing attention to the importance of
nationalism in the period. His book's flaw is accepting a simplistic model
of historical change. As Albert Hirschman wrote in The Passions and the
Interests, "To portray a lengthy ideological change or transition as an
endogenous process is of course more complex than to depict it as the rise
of an independently conceived, insurgent ideology concurrent with the
decline of a hitherto dominant ethic." Newman's picture is of the less
complex sort. Once this is recognized, the book has much of importance
to say, especially about the languages of politics in the later eighteenth
century.
LAWRENCE

E.

KLEIN

University of Nevada, Las M?gas

STEPHEN K. LAND. The Philosophy of Language in Britain: Major
Theories from Hobbes to Thomas Reid. New York: AMS Press,
1986. Pp. 255. $37.50.

The Figural and the Literal: Problems of Language in the History
ofScience and Philosophy, 1630-1800. Edited by ANDREW E. BENJAMIN, GEOFFREY N. CANTOR, and JOHN R. R. CHRISTIE. Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1987. Pp. 229. £27.50.
Some of the most interesting and important recent work in the intellectual history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has concerned
itself with the philosophy of language in relation to science and literature.
This kind of work promises a fresh understanding of the linguistic and
figural basis of the conceptual categories employed by major philosophers
during this period. It has become increasingly clear that speculation concerning the nature and origin of language is not merely a digression or
afterthought in the work of Locke, Berkeley, Adam Smith, or Thomas
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Reid. Two recent studies examine the various ways in which problems of
language are intrinsic to the era's most vital intellectual issues.
Stephen Land's The Philosophy of Language in Britain examines the
work of several major British philosophers, focusing particularly on Hobbes,
Locke, Berkeley, Adam Smith, Lord Monboddo, James Harris, and Thomas Reid. Land tracks down virtually everything these authors had to say
about language, and he attempts a comprehensive statement of their linguistic theories while also remaining sensitive to the context and occasion
of each passage. The declared intention of this study is to provide a close
analysis of each major theory, "with comparison and cross-reference among
them on basic issues, so that the outlines and fundamental assumptions
of each can be displayed" (p. 2). The underlying assumption of this methodology seems to be that such close analysis of each author must precede
the study of historical relations and the development of ideas from one
author to another. And indeed there has never been such a painstaking
analysis of what these authors had to say on the subject of language. But
the book's methodology remains open to question on the ground that there
is no such thing as ahistorical understanding, since any attempt to abstract
the pure ideational content of a given theory must be conditioned by its
own anachronistic frame of reference. The Philosophy of Language in
England is strongest when it situates its chosen authors in a specific historical context, and weakest when it seeks to assimilate their linguistic
speculations to modern theories of structuralism and generative grammar.
The chapter on Locke illustrates the strengths of Land's method. This
chapter seeks to refute the conventional historiographical view that Locke's
philosophy of language belongs to an empiricist tradition radically opposed
to Cartesian rationalism. On the contrary, says Land, Locke's linguistic
theory is entirely compatible with the doctrines of rationalism, particularly
as represented by the Grammaire of Port-Royal (1660), which sought to
illustrate the innate logical faculties of the human mind through the descriptive categories of universal grammar. Although Locke denies the existence of innate ideas, he acknowledges the universality of logical faculties, and he regards language as an index of those faculties in much the
same way as the universal grammarians. Language, for Locke, "is essentially a reflection of its ideational base" (p. 32). Locke explores the consequences of this view in the third book of his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (1690), which develops a theory of language that Land
terms "semantic idealism." The major premise of Locke's theory, according to Land, is "that the meaning of a word depends upon the corresponding
idea in the mind of a speaker" (p. 59). Words do not refer directly to
things, but only to ideas. As a result, it becomes very difficult to tell
whether a word has the same meaning for two different speakers, since
my idea of "gratitude" may not be the same as yours, and we can hardly
resolve our differences by pointing to a concrete physical object. Only by
rigorous logical analysis and careful definition can we reach agreement
on the meaning of words. Land places Locke convincingly in the rationalist
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tradition of linguistic theory, since for Locke the ultimate criterion of
lexical reference is not empirical but logical.
The chapter on Berkeley, on the other hand, exemplifies the main weakness of Land's method. This chapter, entitled "Berkeleyan Theory: Structuralism" develops a reading of Berkeley that is comprehensive and wellgrounded in Berkeley's scattered reflections on language, but depends for
its major distinctions and emphases on modern structural linguistics. According to Land, Berkeley developed the conceptual basis for "the first
significantly non-Aristotelian grammar in the Western world" (p. 129). "In
his work, almost two centuries before Saussure, we encounter a recognizably structural approach to meaning-a theory in which words signify
ideas and the meaning of an idea is determined by its place in an ordered
structure or 'language' of ideas" (p. 130). The first half of the analogythat "words signify ideas"-is hardly unique to Berkeley, and must be
derived from Locke. The second half of the analogy-that "the meaning
of an idea is determined by its place in an ordered structure"-is merely
a consequence of Berkeley's premise that all words are arbitrary signs.
For Berkeley, an idea must exist in differential relation to other ideas,
since it has only an arbitrary connection with the thing it denotes by a
word. But the doctrine of linguistic arbitrariness may also be found in
Locke, or in Aristotle for that matter. There may be striking resemblances
between Berkeley and Saussure, but these are best explained as a result
of their common participation in a tradition of Lockean linguistics that
places great stress on linguistic arbitrariness and the relation between
words and ideas.
The Philosophy of Language in England remains a remarkably informative and useful book, particularly because of its detailed, rigorous analyses
of particular authors. It seeks to redeem from obscurity the linguistic
speculations of James Harris, whose Hermes (1751) was in its time the
most widely-read British contribution to universal grammar, and Lord
Monboddo, whose six-volume treatise Of the Origin and Progress of Language (1773-92) proposed a persuasive alternative to Condillac and Rousseau on the origin of language. Land also examines the theories of Adam
Smith, whose Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages (1761) developed a genetic model to explain the differentiation of
the parts of speech, and Thomas Reid, whose Inquiry into the Human
Mind (1764) and Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785) advanced a "common sense" philosophy that posited cognitive universals in
order to refute the skepticism of Hume. Linguistic universals provide Reid
with a major source of evidence for these cognitive universals.
Land's approach to these theorists might be termed "reconstructive,"
since he seeks to describe the systematic body of thought that underlies
their often fragmentary and sometimes incoherent statements about language. His discussion of Adam Smith, for instance, attempts to "iron out"
apparent contradictions in order to yield "a highly coherent theory" (p.
141). A radically different approach is taken by a collection of essays
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entitled The Figural and the Literal: Problems of Language in the History
of Science and Philosophy, 1630-1800. These essays are avowedly deconstructionist in their approach to linguistic theory in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Taking their cue from Jacques Derrida's White Mythology (1971) and Paul de Man's Allegories of Reading (1979), they
seek to unravel the neat distinction between literal and figural discourse
in order to demonstrate the essentially rhetorical status of logical categories. Rather than "ironing out" inconsistencies, they acknowledge these
as ineluctable moments of self-difference within the text of philosophy.
As John Christie puts it in his excellent introduction, this method of
reading "recognises as problems, as areas of opacity, what otherwise [would]
remain transparent and invisible to interpretive understanding" (p. 2).
Within this general interpretive framework, the essays in this volume
develop a variety of approaches to the problematic status of writing and
rhetoric in science and philosophy. The Figural and the Literal is most
interesting in its implications for the history of science, a discipline that
is currently being reconceived under the influence of Thomas Kuhn and
the more general rebirth of interest in the figural basis of scientific discourse. The freshest and most provocative of these essays seek to subvert
the old-fashioned positivist view of "progress" by rereading scientific texts
with an eye to their central metaphors and discursive strategies. Less
successful, on the whole, are the essays on canonical texts by Descartes,
Locke, Diderot, and Hume, largely because the figural basis of this material has already been fully exposed by Derrida and de Man.
Two of these essays deal with the establishment of a distinctive scientific
discourse among the first members of the Royal Society. Jan Golinski's
essay, "Robert Boyle: Skepticism and Authority in Seventeenth-Century
Chemical Discourse," examines the role of eyewitness testimony in Boyle's
accounts of chemical experiments. Boyle's new science of matter, as expounded in The Sceptical Chymist ( 1661 ), relies for its discursive authority
on the direct narration of actual experiments, supported by eyewitnesses,
and seeks to undermine the credibility of more traditional accounts of
abstract chemical principles. Golinsky argues that Boyle's much-vaunted
"experimental method" is as much a textual strategy as it is an empirical
practice. Boyle's colleague John Wilkins, a fellow-member of the Royal
Society, is the subject of Tony Davies's essay, "The Ark in Flames: Science,
Language, and Education in Seventeenth-Century England." John Wilkins
shared Boyle's dissatisfaction with traditional modes of scientific discourse
and invented a new philosophical language that would enable the communication of experimental results to bypass the troubling medium of
ordinary language. Wilkins's Essay Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language (1668) is utopian in its desire to replace spoken language with an international scientific notation that would be absolutely
precise and unambiguous. Davies claims that this utopian scheme subverts
the materialist and realist epistemology of the Royal Society, since "it is
not nature that is 'real' in Wilkins' book but his invented language" (p.

546

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES

88). For Wilkins the authority of scientific discourse depends on a textual
strategy that rejects spoken language in favor of a taxonomic system that
can exist only in writing.
The nature of scientific discourse is further examined by Geoffrey Cantor in his essay, "Weighing Light: The Role of Metaphor in EighteenthCentury Optical Discourse." Isaac Newton's Opticks (1706) introduced
the proposition that light rays are "very small bodies emitted from shining
surfaces" (p. 132), and throughout the eighteenth century this "corpuscular hypothesis" was an accepted part of scientific discourse. Cantor
traces the vagaries of this hypothesis, arguing that the metaphor of "particles" was constitutive of scientific discourse, since there was no "literal"
expression to which it referred. The corpuscular hypothesis was also generative, since it led to further experiments to determine the mass, size,
and velocity of the supposed particles of light. Cantor concludes that the
literal/figural distinction is inadequate to distinguish scientific from literary discourse, since both are vitally metaphorical, and he notes the
crossing-over of scientific metaphor into William Blake's poem, "Mock on,
mock on, Voltaire, Rousseau," which satirizes "Newton's Particles of Light"
as a gross misunderstanding of the spirituality of light in "the beams
divine" (p. 133). Cantor's essay points the way for future research into
the problematic relation between science and literature in the eighteenth
century.
John Christie's essay, "Adam Smith's Metaphysics of Language," is
likewise preoccupied with the crossing-over of metaphors between different
types of discourse. Christie examines The Wealth of Nations (1776) from
the standpoint of Adam Smith's earlier essay on the formation of languages
(1761), arguing that "Smith conceived of economic development ... through
a model developed in his study of the systematic signification inherent in
science and language" (p. 221). Smith describes the development of the
parts of speech as the result of incremental innovations by successive
generations of speakers. Just as language develops in communicative power
through the invention of the parts of speech, so too does the market increase
in size and complexity through the gradual division of labor. Smith's economic theory, in short, is based on the same model of social development
as his theory of language. The larger historical implication of this argument
would seem to be that Smith's economic theory (and, by extension, the
ideology of capitalism) is grounded in a metaphor derived from Smith's
inquiry into the origin of language.
Christie's essay tends to support the view that linguistic speculation
emerges as a dominant locus of cultural and ideological formation in the
mid-eighteenth century. In this way his essay enables us to reexamine the
importance of linguistic theory for intellectual history. The two books
discussed here are among the best recent studies exploring the significance
of speculation concerning the nature and origin of language in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The growing interest of scholars in the
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history of linguistic theory will ultimately provide a more adequate understanding of the complex relations among the discourses of science,
philosophy, economics, and literature.
JAMES

C. McKusiCK

University of Maryland, Baltimore County

American Silhouettes: Rhetorical Identities of the Founders. New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press,
1987. Pp. 168. $17.50.

ALBERT FURTWANGLER

Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
But will they come when you do call them?

I Henry IV, 111,1: 52-4.

On first reading, American Silhouettes is liable to seem expository rather
than analytical, a deft contribution to a minor genre, a set of profiles
artfully cut from black paper for our historical pleasure and quiet edification, contemporary criticism's version of fancy, in other words, an eighteenth-century performance blinking in our odd light. Were this the case,
I would have little to object to (the red dye on the cover comes off on
one's hands), and the rest would be summary. In a series of six vignettes
featuring five focal figures, Albert Furtwangler sketches the American
Founders-Franklin, Adams, Washington, Jefferson, and Marshall-vexed
by ideological crisis, and responding with more assured and coherent understandings of themselves. These enhanced self-conceptions then serve
as examplary public models, to a certain extent for the Founders' contemporaries, perhaps more deeply so, Furtwangler suggests, for us, since we
also inhabit a confused time. Read this way, American Silhouettes supplies
a cogent and unusually intimate portrait of the men in their time, a frequently moving portrait, most powerfully so in the chapter on John Adams
and the Novanglus/Massachusettensis debate; less so in the chapters on
Jefferson and Franklin, where the real person seems to remain outside the
circle of Furtwangler's light, though this is not due to some flagging of
his sympathetic intelligence. Rather, like Melville and numerous others,
Furtwangler is stopped at the border of the real Franklin, a border Franklin
drew and continues to guard.
Furtwangler is a subtle writer, though, and there is more than group
portraiture going on in this book. The underlying argument is introduced
in the subtitle: Rhetorical Identities of the Founders. Contemporary decorum has presumably dictated the substitution of Founders for Founding
Fathers, but the latter term would be more appropriate, given the particular kind of problematic origination the book addresses. (Furtwangler uses

